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Should we build on the Greenbelt?
Henry Overman discusses his views and impressions of the recent British Government
at LSE event on whether we should build on the greenbelt, arguing that strong
greenbelts don’t deliver the kind of development people want in the places where they
want to live. 
I enjoyed our Brit ish Government at LSE debate on whether we should build on the
greenbelt (at some point, podcast should be available here). For those of  you that are
interested, I’ve reproduced my contribution below. But f irst, two observations about the debate.
Let me start with the broader point. I was expecting to be in a small minority f avouring building on the
greenbelt (certainly my experience in the past). But this t ime f elt dif f erent because there were a number
of  younger people in the room who were pretty vocal and very articulate about problems they f aced
paying f or housing. Don’t get me wrong, there have been problems in the housing market f or many poor
and young people f or a long time. But – much to our shame – these people don’t have much of  a voice at
the kind of  events that debate housing markets. A new generation of  young university students who f ind
themselves really struggling do take part in such debates. I wonder if  that could be a ‘game changer’ in
terms of  the direction of  the debate?
My other point is a litt le more technical. If  you do listen to the podcast you’ll hear a number of  people
claiming that we have no housing supply problem in the UK, that the problem is all down to demand. I
certainly think that demand plays a role (I’d like to see the issue of  VAT on newbuild and impact f ees
properly addressed, f or example) but I think the evidence is clear that it can’t all be demand. There are
then two ways of  interpreting what people mean when they assert the opposite, neither of  which I much
like. The f irst is that people should stop aspiring to live in reasonable size f lats and houses (possibly
with some outdoor space). That is, we are ‘wrong’ to demand so much housing. Second, is that housing
is the only f ree to enter market where demand and supply f or some reason do NOT jointly determine
price.
I say that, because if  housing supply really is f lat (so that the problem is all demand) then house prices
should ONLY change to ref lect the cost of  house building excluding land. It ’s impossible f or this to
explain 4 per cent real price growth in the UK since 1970! It also can’t explain why land with planning
permission sells f or £3-4m per hectare as opposed to £10k. A third possibility is that there is enough
land in our existing cit ies but ‘f or some reason’ this land isn’t being developed (vague accusations are
made against Local Authorit ies and developers). But it ’s almost impossible to explain this kind of
behaviour without distortions on the supply side (taking us back to where we started – how can the
ONLY problems be on the demand side).
Anyhow, an interesting debate, and I was gratef ul to Government at LSE f or organising it. My contribution
to the debate f ollows below:
Should we (ever) build on the green belt?
There are plenty of  people who think we should not. For simplicity, I will characterise them as belonging
to one of  two groups: Dark green and light green def enders of  the Greenbelt.
Dark green defenders ask us to f ocus on the beautif ul English countryside. They play up the
environmental and amenity value of  that countryside and make the case that we must preserve it f or
f uture generations.
Light green defenders ask us to look instead to our towns and cit ies. They play up the environmental and
social benef its of  building at density. Better more walk able communities, more public transport use,
better public good provision. For this group, preserving the countryside is just a happy side ef f ect of
achieving higher densit ies that must be good f or all.
I f ind the dark green defenders difficult to argue with. Not, I hasten to add because I think they are right.
Rather because they are so one sided, so willing to overstate the social benef its of  the countryside and
so willing to ignore the large social costs that come f rom restricting development.
In contrast, the light green argument has merit. My disagreements with its proponents more nuanced. In
short I think they over play the benef its of  density, overstate our ability to deliver enough housing at
higher densit ies and underestimate the costs of  f ailing to deliver enough housing. There will be time to
cover many of  these issues in more detail, so I will limit my opening remarks to f ocus on six key points:
Green belts (and the planning system more generally) restrict supply and increase house prices (with a
regressive impact on low to middle income f amilies). Hilber and Vermeulen suggest that an area moving
f rom an average to the lowest level of  restrictiveness would see house prices f all by around 30 per cent.
Green belts increase housing market volatility. At least until the recession, average house price volatility in
the UK was higher than the most volatile single market in the US (Los Angeles).
Green belts increases office rents. Cheshire and Hilber (2008) caref ully document how planning
restrictions in England impose a ‘tax’ on of f ice developments that varies f rom around 250 per cent (of
development costs) in Birmingham, to 400-800 per cent in London. In contrast, New York imposes a ‘tax’
of  around 0-50 per cent, Amsterdam around 200 per cent and central Paris around 300 per cent.
Green belt lowers retail productivity and the employment of small independent retailers. Cheshire et al
(2011) demonstrate that planning rules reduced productivity in a leading supermarket chain by at least 20
per cent while Sadun and Haskel show that small and independent shops have been hurt by town centre
f irst policies.
A strict green belt policy may not allow for the true social costs of brownfield versus greenfield development.
Alex will / talked about this in more depth. By 2005, 70 per cent of  new development was on brownf ield
land. We don’t know what this did to the pattern of  development within cit ies, or on the overall ef f ects
f or the city as a whole. Could skewing development towards city centres have come at the expense of
manuf acturing and less overall growth? Brownf ield land is expensive to build on – how much does this
explain current low levels of  building? Was garden grabbing a good idea? (the share of  new homes built
on previously residential land rose f rom 11 per cent to 23 per cent between 1997 and 2008; according to
the Guardian, the waiting list f or allotments currently stands at 86,000 people). Green belts, brownf ield
targets and density standards have also tended to produce large numbers of  small f lats in urban areas –
although there is a clear need f or larger, f amily homes in these places.
In short, strong greenbelts don’t deliver the kind of  development people want in the places where they
want to live. These costs need to be of f set against the benef its of  preserving undeveloped land.
Undeveloped land does deliver benef its, but research suggests that – particularly f or high intensity
agricultural land at the edges of  our towns and cit ies – these benef its are of ten not as large as claimed
(Gibbons et al 2011).
Time, perhaps, to start building on (some of ) the greenbelt af ter all?
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